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THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONFLICT
AND RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY
THOMAS J. BERNARD*
Radical criminology has been the subject of considerable interest
within American criminology in recent years. The term is associated
with a number of theorists, including Richard Quinney, Herman
Schwendinger, Tony Platt, William Chambliss, and Paul Takagi.' But
the content of radical criminology is less familiar to nonradical crimi-
nologists, due in part to the extent of the divergence of radical criminol-
ogy from other branches of the field. In particular, some confusion
exists concerning the distinction between radical and conflict criminol-
ogy, where conflict criminology is associated with the works of theorists
such as George Vold and Austin Turk, as well as with earlier works of
several theorists who later became radical criminologists, such as Quin-
ney's The SocialRealioy of Crime and Chambliss and Seidman's Law, Order,
and Power.2 The confusion between these two perspectives is related to
the fact that most American radical criminologists considered them-
selves conflict criminologists about ten years ago. The confusion also
results because the two perspectives partially share the same intellectual
heritage in the works of Karl Marx, and that Marxism, to which radical
* Doctoral Candidate, State University of New York at Albany, School of Criminal Jus-
tice.
1 See R. QUINNEY, CLASS, STATE AND CRIME (1977) [hereinafter R. QUINNEY (1977)],
and CRITIQUE OF LEGAL ORDER (1974) [hereinafter cited as R. QUINNEY (1974)]; Platt,
Prospects for a Radical Crimino/ogy in the United States, 1 CRIME & Soc. JUST. 2 (1974); Cham-
bliss, Toward a Political Economy of Crime, 2 THEORY & SOC. 149 (1975); Schwendinger &
Schwendinger, Defenders of Order or Guardians of Human Rights?, 5 ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY 123
(1970). See also B. KRISBERG, CRIME AND PRIVILEGE--TOWARD A NEW CRIMINOLOGY
(1975); F. PEARCE, CRIMES OF THE POWERFUL (1976); R. QUINNEY & J. WILDEMAN, THE
PROBLEM OF CRIME: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINOLOGY (2d ed. 1977); I. TAY-
LOR, P. WALTON & J. YOUNG, THE NEW CRIMINOLOGY (1973), and CRITICAL CRIMINOL-
OGY (1975).
2 R. QUINNEY, THE SOCIAL REALITY OF CRIME (1970); W. CHAMBLISS & R. SEIDMAN,
LAW, ORDER, AND POWER (1971). See also R. DENISOFF & C. MCCAGHEY, DEVIANCE, CON-
FLICT AND CRIMINALITY (1973); J. GALLIHER & J. MCCARTNEY, CRIMINOLOGY-POWER,
CRIME AND CRIMINAL LAW (1977); S. HILLS, CRIME, POWER AND MORALITY (1971); C.
REASONS & R. RICH, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAw-A CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE (1978); T. SEL-
LIN, CULTURE CONFLICT AND CRIME (1938); A. TURK, CRIMINALITY AND LEGAL ORDER
(1969); G. VOLD, THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY (1958).
CONFLICT AND RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY
criminology is closely aligned, has long been presented as a part of con-
flict theory.
However, a clear distinction presently exists between these perspec-
tives within the context of American criminology, so that radical crimi-
nology is no longer considered a part of conflict criminology by either
radical or conflict criminologists. For example, Paul Takagi has stated
that "a 'conflict theorist' remains in the liberal tradition, albeit critical
of the functionalist perspective."'3 An article by Austin Turk appeared in
a special issue of Crnminology devoted to "radical criminology" and drew
angry responses from the radicals.4 In that article, Turk dissociated con-
flict criminology from radical criminology, stating that one of the most
"pernicious" misrepresentations of conflict theory is that "such work is
synonymous with partisan ideological treatises on behalf of less powerful
collections of people against more powerful collections." 5 Such misrep-
resentation is fairly widespread and has resulted in a number of unwar-
ranted criticisms of conflict theory.
6
The present paper focuses on the distinction between conflict and
radical criminology. It begins with a discussion of the work of Marx and
Engels on crime, in order to clarify the relationship of their thought to
that of present-day conflict and radical criminologists. It then presents
the basic principles that underlie conflict criminology and those that
underlie radical criminology. Each principle of radical criminology is
then contrasted to the position taken by conflict criminology.
MARX AND ENGELS ON CRIME
Radical criminology has been defined as that criminology which
takes a Marxist approach to crime and crime control. 7 But the positions
that Karl Marx himself took on the subject are a matter of some contro-
versy. For example, Hirst has argued that:
Marxism has a quite different view of crime and "deviancy" from that of
the radicals; a view that abolishes this field as a coherent object of study.
There is no "Marxist theory of deviance," either in existence, or which can
be developed within orthodox Marxism. . . . The objects of Marxist the-
ory are specified by its own concepts: the mode of production, the class
struggle, the state, ideology, etc. Any attempt to apply Marxism to this
3 Takagi, Book Review, 67 J. CRIM. L. & C. 256 (1976).
4 Editorial, 11 CRIME & SOC. JusT. 2 (1979).
5 Turk, Anayzing OjcialDeviance." For Nonpartisan Conflict Anay~is in Criminology, 16 CRIMI-
NOLOGY 459, 460 (1979). See alro Turk, Class, Confitj, and Criminalization, 10 Soc. Focus 209
(1977), in which he distinguishes between Marxian and Weberian criminologists.
6 G. VOLD, THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 315-22 (2d ed. T. Bernard 1979) [hereinafter
cited as G. VOLD II].
7 Garofalo, Radical Criminology and Criminal Justice: Points of Divergence and Contact, 10
CRIME & SOC. JUST. 17, 18 (1978).
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pre-given field of sociology is therefore a more or less "revisionist" activity
in respect of Marxism; it must modify and distort Marxist concepts to suit
its own pre-Marxist purpose.8
Marx's theory was a theory of history, not a theory of human behavior. 9
He maintained that the ideas and institutions of society, such as the
ideologies, values, and the legal and political structures, must be under-
stood in terms of the economic base of that society, and he attempted to
expose the processes by which those ideas and institutions changed over
time.10 He did not, however, argue that man's behavior was motivated
primarily by economic factors.1 I
Marx dealt with the problem of crime only briefly and incidentally
in his work, and Cain and Hunt state that "there is no ready-made
'Marxist theory of crime' to be found in the texts . . . despite the fact
that the majority of the extracts advance some 'explanation' of the phe-
nomenon of crime."' 2 Hirst argues that there are three distinct Marxist
positions on law and crime, which are directly related to three general
theoretical positions in three different periods.13 The earliest period in-
volved a "Kantian-liberal critique of law," in which Marx argued:
Laws are as little repressive measures directed against freedom as the law
,f gravity is a repressive measure directed against movement. . . . Laws
are rather positive, bright and general norms in which freedom has at-
tained to an existence that is impersonal, theoretical and independent of
the arbitrariness of individuals. A people's statute book is its Bible of free-
dom . ... 14
8 Hirst, Marx and Engels on Law, Crime and Morality, in I. TAYLOR, P. WALTON & J.
YOUNG, CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 204 (1975). See also Denisoff & McQuarie, Crime Control in
Capitalist Society: A Reply to Quinney, 10 ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY 109 (1975), which argues that
Marx devoted two entire books to refuting a philosophical position identical to Quinney's.
9 A. BALINKY, MARX'S ECONOMICS: ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 8 (1970). Balinky
summarizes Marx's theory in the following points:
(1) There are, in fact, social-historical laws which govern the universe; (2) such laws
operate, in the final analysis, independent of human will or desire; (3) on the contrary,
man's value system and the behavior pattern based on them are set by these laws; (4)
relying on the method of positive science, man can discover what these laws are and how
they operate and thereby comprehend the process by which society evolves to where and
what it is; (5) with the same key man can unlock the door of the future and see, if only in
contour form, the direction in which society will evolve and to what final end; (6) Com-
munism, not Socialism, will be the terminal social order; (7) social improvement (which,
for Marx, is synonymous with change) is inevitable not because of the fact or extent of
human suffering but as a function of the laws themselves.
10 M. CORNFORTH, HISTORICAL MATERIALISM (2d ed. 1962); A. SWINGEWOOD, MARX
AND MODERN SOCIAL THEORY (1975); Williams, Base andSuperstructure in Marxist Cultural The-
ogy, 82 NEw LEFr REV. 3 (1973).
11 A. BALINKY, supra note 9, at 40.
12 M. CAIN & A. HUNT, MARX AND ENGELS ON LAw 149 (1979).
13 Hirst, supra note 8, at 205.
14 Marx, The Proceedings of the Sixth Rhenish Parliament (1842), in KARL MARX-EARLY
TEXTS (D. McLellan ed. 1971), quoted in Hirst, supra note 8, at 206.
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The second position relates to the Feuerbachian period, in which Marx
reduced all social phenomena, including the law, to the essential contra-
diction between labor as a self-realizing human activity and its aliena-
tion in private property.' 5 The third position, generally considered the
"orthodox Marxist" one, is found in the Historical Materialist phase,
and focused on the demoralization of the parasitic lumpenproletariat.1
6
Marx argued that productive labor was essential to human nature, but
that capitalist society depended on a large pool of chronically unem-
ployed and underemployed people offering their services on the labor
market. Because they were not productive, these people were demoral-
ized and subject to vice and crime. Marx described them as a parasitic
class, living off of the labor of the working class through theft, extortion,
and beggary, or by providing demoralizing services such as prostitution
and gambling. Engels developed this formulation more extensively.'
7
Cain and Hunt point out that the third "orthodox Marxist" posi-
tion is quite consistent with sociological positivism. 18 Marx asserted the
social character of crime against the emphasis on individual responsibil-
ity found in classical criminology. For example, Marx approvingly
quoted from Quetelet in a discussion of-the death penalty to demon-
strate that social conditions, rather than individuals, cause crime.' 9 In
addition, his views, like those of positivist criminologists in general, were
based on a "natural" definition of crime:
Throughout their writings both Marx and Engels take crime to be a
self-evident social phenomenon. It is assumed that there are certain forms
of behaviour and action which are instrinsically 'criminal,' which violate
an unstated but nevertheless real set of criteria. This unproblematic con-
ception of crime Marx and Engels shared with the majority of nineteenth,
and indeed twentieth, century writers on crime and criminality.
20
But in another set of passages, the "natural" definition of crime is
abandoned. These passages include what Cain and Hunt call Marx's
"primitive rebellion" thesis, where crime is described as the struggle of
the isolated individual against the prevailing conditions,2' and the
passages where Engels pointed out the class bias involved in the
15 K. MARX, THE ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844 (M. Milligan
trans.), cited in Hirst, supra note 8, at 215.
16 K. MARX & F. ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (1848), citedin Hirst,
supra note 8, at 215.
17 See genera ly F. ENGELS, THE CONDITION OF THE WORKING CLASS IN ENGLAND IN
1844; Preface, THE PEASANT WAR IN GERMANY (1874).
18 M. CAIN & A. HUNT, upra note 12, at 150.
'9 Marx, Capital Pwnishrment, in ARTICLES ON BRITAIN at 150-53 (1853), quoted in M. CAIN
& A. HUNT, supra note 12, at 195.
20 Id. at 149. For the relationship of positivist criminology to "natural" definitions of
crime, see G. VOLD II, supra note 6, at 10-11, 382-83.
21 K. MARX & F. ENGELS, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY 365-67 (1965).
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processes of the enactment and the enforcement of laws.2 2 Both sets of
passages point to the law as a form of class oppression rather than as a
legitimate response to intrinsically criminal behavior. The definition of
crime used here might be called a "labelling" definition-that is, crime
is whatever the agencies of the criminal justice system define as crime,
whether or not these actions are thought to be intrinsically criminal.
23
THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT AND RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY
No general statement seems to be commonly agreed among conflict
or radical criminologists to represent the postulates of their viewpoints,
and disagreements among the various theorists are as common in those
branches of criminology as in any other branch. Nevertheless, some
basic themes run through their writings, on which observers generally
agree. The following is an effort to summarize those themes into a spe-
cific number of points to represent the core principles of the two respec-
tive viewpoints.
The principles of conflict criminology are considerably more gen-
eral than those of radical criminology. The following statement of these
principles has been borrowed in large part from Chambliss and Seid-
man's analysis of the relationship of values to the enactment of laws, and
was influenced by Vold's theory of group conflict and by Quinney's the-
ory of the social reality of crime.
2 4
1) One's "web of life" or the conditions of one's life affect one's
values and interests.
2) Complex societies are composed of groups with widely different
life conditions.
3) Therefore, complex societies are composed of groups with dis-
parate and conflicting sets of values and interests.
4) The behavior of individuals is generally consistent with their
values and interests.
5) Because values and interests tend to remain stable over time,
groups tend to develop relatively stable behavior patterns that differ in
varying degrees from the behavior patterns of other groups.
6) The enactment of laws is the result of a conflict and compro-
mise process in which different groups attempt to promote their own
values and interests.
7) Individual laws usually represent a combination of the values
and interests of many groups, rather than the specific values and inter-
22 F. ENGELS, supra note 17, at 567-90.
23 See G. VoLD II, supra note 6, at 13, 382, 384.
24 W. CHAMBLISS & R. SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 473-74; R. QUINNEY, supra note 2, at
15-23; G. VoLD II, supra note 6, at 13, 382, 384.
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ests of any one particular group. Nevertheless, the higher a group's po-
litical and economic position, the more the law in general tends to
represent the values and interests of that group.
8) Therefore, in general, the higher a group's political and eco-
nomic position, the less likely it is that the behavior patterns characteris-
tic of the group (behaviors consistent with their values and interests) will
violate the law, and vice versa.
9) In general, the higher the political and economic position of an
individual, the more difficult it is for official law enforcement agencies
to process him when his behavior violates the law. This may be because
the types of violations are more subtle and complex, or because the indi-
vidual has greater resources to conceal the violation, to legally defend
himself against official action, or to exert influence extralegally on the
law enforcement process.
10) As bureaucrats, law enforcement agencies will generally proc-
ess easier rather than more difficult cases.
11) Therefore, in general, law enforcement agencies will process
individuals from lower rather than higher political and economic
groups.
12) Because of the processes of law enactment and enforcement
described above, the official crime rates of groups will tend to be in-
versely proportional to their political and economic position, independ-
ent of any other factors (such as social or biological ones) that might also
influence the distribution of crime rates.
As formulated here, conflict criminology is a probability statement
explaining the distribution of crime rates among various groups in soci-
ety. The explanation of criminal behavior is not its primary purpose.
These two modes of explanation can be distinguished by considering
cases where there is an obvious difference between changes in official
crime rates and changes in the incidence of the criminal behaviors. For
example, convictions for white collar offenses are increasing, although
the incidence of those behaviors may actually be decreasing, while con-
victions for homosexuality are decreasing as the incidence of those be-
haviors may be increasing. One must offer one type of explanation for
the criminal behavior itself, and another type for the official crime rates.
The second type would focus on changing patterns of values and inter-
ests among groups with varying degrees of political influence on the en-
actment and enforcement of laws. The explanation for official crime
rates is equally meaningful in situations where the official crime rates
and the rates of criminal behavior do not diverge.
In conflict criminology, criminal behavior is "explained" through
an implicit assumption, stated explicitly here, that the behavior of indi-
1981]
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viduals is generally consistent with their values and interests. To the
extent that the behavior of individuals is inconsistent with values and
interests, the conflict explanation of crime rates is erroneous. One can
argue, however, that all behaviors are consistent by hypothesizing retro-
spectively about the values and interests behind any particular behav-
ior. For example, one might explain the behaviors of a Richard Speck
or a Charles Manson in terms of their values and interests, but this may
push the theory too far.
25
There are a number of similarities between conflict criminology
and Sutherland's differential association theory.26 Sutherland's was a
theory of "normative conflict"-the conflict of values-whereas conflict
criminology includes conflict of both values and interests, and some-
times downplays the role of values by maintaining that they in some
sense reflect the interests of the individual. That position derives gener-
ally from Marx's argument that economic relations influence the devel-
opment of beliefs. In addition, both conflict theory and differential
association theory argue that criminal behaviors originate in exactly the
same processes as noncriminal behaviors, so that criminal behaviors are
said to be "normal." Finally, in his later work, Sutherland used differ-
ential association theory to explain the behavior of white collar
criminals, but that work can also can be interpreted as a conflict expla-
nation of the low crime rates among white collar groups, despite the
high incidence of what he characterized as criminal behaviors.
27
The basic difference between conflict criminology and what might
be called mainstream criminology lies in their differing views of the
function of law. Gibbons and Garabedian describe mainstream crimi-
nology as "liberal-cynical," in which a basic assumption that the causes
of crime "are exceedingly pervasive and intimately bound up with the
core institutions of modern society" is combined with a pessimistic atti-
tude toward the ability of the criminal justice system to deal effectively
with the crime problem.28 Michalowski states that liberal criminology is
based on a pluralist model of social organization, which he summarizes
as follows:
1) Society is composed of diverse social groups.
2) There exists among these groups differing, and sometimes conflicting
definitions of right and wrong.
3) There is collective agreement on the mechanisms for dispute settle-
ment.
25 See G. VOLD II, supra note 6, at 296-97, 303.
26 E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, CRIMINOLOGY 80-82 (10th ed. 1978).
27 E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME (1949).
28 Gibbons & Garabedian, Conserative, Liberal and Radical Cn'ninology: Some Trends and Ob-
seivations, in THE CRIMINOLOGIST: CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL 51, 52, 53 (C. Reasons ed.
1974).
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4) The legal system is value-neutral.
5) The legal system is concerned with the best interests of society.29
Thus, liberal criminology begins with the same assumption of conflict
among groups as does conflict criminology. In contrast to this is "con-
servative" criminology, which assumes that law represents a consensus
among all the people, and that "those who violate the law represent a
unique subgroup. °30 Liberal criminology does not assume a consensus,
arguing only that the law is a value-neutral forum for the resolution of
conflicts. It makes this assumption despite its general pessimism about
the effectiveness of law. Because the law is value-neutral, the reasons for
the present distribution of crime rates must be found in general social or
biological conditions outside the legal process. In contrast, conflict
criminology argues that the law enactment and enforcement process is
part of the conflict among groups in society, so that the reasons for the
present distribution of crime rates are to be found primarily within that
process. Specifically, it goes beyond the liberal-cynical attitude that
characterizes the criminal justice system as ineffective, and argues that
the structure of the system necessarily produces the present distribution
of crime rates, even if those who function within that system do not
intend that result and are unaware that they are producing the result.
Radical criminology begins with the same assumptions on the exist-
ence of conflicts as does conflict and liberal criminology, but then moves
off in a distinctly Marxist direction. The following statement of the ba-
sic principles of radical criminology has been compiled from a variety of
sources:
1) No consensus exists in society on the basic values and interests
of individuals, and on the contrary, society is characterized by conflict
on these issues.
2) Society in general is divided into classes whose members have
similar values and interests, the principal classes being those who own
the means of production (the ruling class) and those who are employed
in production (the working class). The principal conflict in society is
between the ruling class and the working class.
31
3) Crimes are defined as socially harmful actions that violate ba-
sic human rights.3 2 That includes both "street" crimes in which the
lower class preys on itself and on others,33 and ruling class crimes in
29 Michalowski, Perspective and Paradigm. Structuring Ciminological Thought in THEORY IN
CRIMINOLOGY 24-25 (R. Meier ed. 1977).
30 Id. at 23. See also Gibbons & Garabedian, supra note 28, at 52.
31 R. QUINNEY (1977), supra note 1.
32 Schwendinger & Schwendinger, supra note 1, at 149; R. QUINNEY & J. WILDEMAN,
supra note 1, at 8.
33 Dod, Platt, Schwendinger, Shank & Takagi, Editoriak The Politics of Street Crime, 5
1981]
THOMASJ BERNARD
which the lower class is victimized through unemployment, pollution,
and exploitation. 34 Because the law is a tool of the ruling class in its
conflict with the working class, the socially harmful actions of the ruling
class are generally not defined as crimes by the official criminal justice
system.
4) Conventional criminologists accept the definitions of crime
provided by the law, and so assume a technocratic role in the social
control of the working class. They do this through "correctionalism,"
which attempts to reconcile the working class to the structure imposed
by the ruling class, and through "reformism," which attempts to im-
prove the operation of the criminal justice system and increase its effec-
tiveness in controlling the working class.
35
5) Radical criminologists reject the definitions of crime provided
by the law and study all socially harmful behaviors that violate basic
human rights. They argue that contradictions in the capitalist eco-
nomic system are the underlying causes of these behaviors.
36
6) The crime problem can be solved only by the overthrow of the
capitalist economic system and the establishment of a socialist state.
Once capitalism is overthrown, the law in its present form will eventu-
ally become unnecessary, as the conflicts between classes will have been
resolved.
37
7) The principal task of radical criminology is to promote the
overthrow of the capitalist economic system, and thus radicals must
guard against the danger of "cooptation," that is, having specific points
of radical criminology accepted by mainstream criminology and placed
in a context that does not promote the overthrow of capitalism.
38
CONFLICT THEORY CONTRASTED WITH RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY
To contrast the content of radical and conflict criminology, the po-
sitions taken by conflict criminology are presented for each of the seven
basic principles of radical criminology.
1) Both conflict and liberal criminologists accept the contention
that society is characterized by conflict among groups with only con-
servative criminologists maintaining that society is characterized by con-
sensus. But all groups, including the radicals, would agree there are
greater degrees of "consensus" about the criminality of some types of
CRIME & SOC. JUST. 1-4 (1976); Platt, 'Street' Crime--4 Viewfiom the Lefl, 9 CRIME AND Soc.
JUST. 26 (1978).
34 R. QUINNEY & J. WILDEMAN, .pra note 1, at 12-14.
35 Garofalo, supra note 7, at 18-19.
36 R. QUINNEY & J. WILDEMAN, supra note 1, at 12.
37 R. QUINNEY (1977), supra note 1, at 64.
38 Garofalo, supra note 7, at 23-24.
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actions than about others. Consider the example of street crime. Radi-
cals generally do not interpret street crime in terms of revolutionary
challenges to the establishment (based on Marx's "primitive rebellion"
thesis), but in terms of the orthodox Marxist position as the depraved
preying of the /u'npenproletariat on the working class.39 These acts are
against the interests of the working class, and are apparently also against
the interests of the ruling class, for they are criminalized by the official
law enforcement agencies. Thus, a "consensus" evidently exists between
the working class and the ruling class on the question of street crime.
That consensus is consistent with the "natural" definition of crime
found in orthodox Marxism, where these actions are viewed as intrinsi-
cally criminal.
Conflict criminology takes a different approach since it is based on
a "labelling" definition of crime: crime is whatever the agencies of the
criminal justice system officially define as crime. While conflict crimi-
nology does not view any action as intrinsically criminal, it also does not
imply any approval of criminalized actions, as Marx did in his "primi-
tive rebellion" thesis. It argues instead that the presence of law is itself
evidence of some degree of conflict, because the behavior of individuals
is said to be consistent with their values and interests. If there were
complete consensus on a particular act, no one would have ever per-
formed that act, and no law would have been passed against it. The
enactment and enforcement of laws is seen as the response of some indi-
viduals and groups when their values and interests have been challenged
by the actions of other individuals and groups who are less politically
powerful. That statement is comparable to Sutherland's sociological
definition of crime although Sutherland limited his definition to the
conflict of values:
[C]rime can be seen to involve four elements: (1) a value which is appreci-
ated by a group or a part of a group which is politically powerful; (2)
isolation of a normative conflict in another part of this group so that its
members do not appreciate the value or appreciate it less highly and conse-
quently tend to endanger it; (3) political declaration that behavior endan-
gering the value is henceforth to be a crime; and (4) pugnacious resort to
coercion decently applied by those who appreciate the value to those who
disregard the value.o
The presence of a law is thus taken to indicate conflict with at least
one group or segment of society, whether or not the remaining groups
have a high degree of consensus among themselves on the desirability of
criminalizing the behavior. In the present example, street criminals are
39 Dod, Platt, Schwendinger, Shank & Takagi, supra note 33, at 2; Platt, sura note 33, at
32.
40 E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, supra note 26, at 12.
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the group or segment that is in conflict with the rest of society. Their
behaviors, which are consistent with their values and interests, are
criminalized by more powerful groups or segments in society who are
defending their own values and interests. That statement is not meant
to convey any approval of the actions of street criminals, or to imply
that somehow the distribution of power should be changed to legalize
street crime. It is meant only as a theoretical description of an empirical
situation.
4 '
Street crime exemplifies a situation where the vast majority of
groups or segments in the society are united in their desire to criminalize
the behaviors of a small and politically powerless group. In this case a
broad and general consensus arguably exists as to the desirability of the
law. But conflict criminologists would also argue that the existence of
such a broad and general consensus does not in itself determine whether
those behaviors are criminalized. The criminalization of behaviors re-
sults solely from the distribution of political power in society. Street
criminals in our society constitute a small and politically powerless seg-
ment of the population, but societies are conceivable in which they com-
prise a small but politically dominant group. The presence of a broad
and widespread consensus against their behaviors would not result in
the criminalization of that dominant group. Certainly, this precise situ-
ation has occurred in many brutal tyrannies.
2) Radical criminologists have been criticized for their reliance on
the concept of class as the ultimate explanation of crime.42 In this age of
common stock ownership, there is no longer a direct relationship be-
tween class and the ownership of the means of production, nor, in this
age of professional management, is there a direct relationship between
ownership and control of the means of production. Although some form
of loose class system exists in America today, class arguably is no longer
the clearly defined phenomenon that it was in the time of Karl Marx.
Radical criminologists must go to considerable lengths to relate this con-
fusing picture of class structure, ownership, and control of the means of
production to the contemporary crime problem.43
In contrast to radical criminology, conflict theory has no necessary
relationship to the concept of class or to the ownership and control of
the means of production. In societies such as Marx's England, where
class was a strong and clearly defined phenomenon, conflict between
classes would be considered an important aspect of the explanation of
crime. But in diverse, pluralistic societies, such as contemporary
41 See A. TURK, supra note 2.
42 Klockars, The Contemporaqy Crises of Marxist Criminology, 16 CRIMINOLOGy 477, 480-86
(1979).
43 See, e.g., R. QUINNEY (1977), supra note 1.
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America, conflict generally must be analyzed in terms of segments or
groups other than class. To the extent that class retains some impor-
tance in contemporary explanations of crime, the concept would not
necessarily be defined in terms of the ownership or control of the means
of production.
3) Radical criminologists maintain that law is a tool of the ruling
class in its struggle with the working class. While Marx maintained that
view in his "primitive rebellion" thesis, he did not necessarily do so else-
where in his writings. In Capital, for example, Marx described the fight
for the enactment and enforcement of laws to shorten the length of the
working day as part of the struggle between the ruling and the working
class.44 That struggle took place in the Parliament and in the bureau-
cracy, indicating that elements of those institutions actually represented
working class interests. This perspective differs from that of the radical
criminologists, who tend to characterize any action of the legislature or
bureaucracy as ultimately in the interests of the ruling class. For exam-
ple, Quinney interprets civil liberties as ultimately benefiting the ruling
class rather than the working class. 45 Klockars points out that such rein-
terpretation is a "heads I win, tails you lose" situation, and that once
such an assumption of evil is adopted, "nothing I can do will refute the
assumption of my evilness . . .[and] anything I do [is] evidence for its
confirmation.
'46
The position of radical criminologists here is less related to the
search for objective truth than to the quest for the overthrow of the
capitalist system. The position of conflict theory is consistent with the
position of Marx above, as it views the processes of enactment and en-
forcement of laws as a struggle between different groups or segments of
society, each attempting to represent their own values and interests. In
the struggle for the shorter working day that Marx described, these
groups clearly were those who owned the means of production and those
who were employed in the production. Conflict criminologists would not
use the term "ruling class" to describe the owners of the means of pro-
duction, although in nineteenth-century England they had a good deal
of political power. They did not, however, have total power, as the term
"ruling class" would imply; this was shown by their need to struggle to
promote their own interests, as well as by the compromises they were
forced to make. Conflict criminology maintains only that in all societies,
communist, socialist, democratic, or fascist, the law represents the values
44 1 K. MARX, CAPITAL ch. 10 (1867). Marx states in section 7 that "The creation of a
normal working day is, therefore, the product of a protracted civil war, more or less dissem-
bled, between the capitalist class and the working class."
45 R. QUINNEY (1974), supra note 1, at 145.
46 Klockars, supra note 42, at 493 (emphasis in original).
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and interests of those groups who are able to muster a majority of
power. In societies in which power is widely distributed, law appears as
an intricate set of compromises between power groups, and might be
called consensus. In societies in which power is narrowly distributed,
law represents the values and interests of a small group who might legiti-
mately be called a ruling class. Such a ruling class, however, would not
necessarily act only to advance their own greed, for both their values
and their perception of long-term self-interest might include the concept
of "the greatest good for the greatest number."
4) The contention that mainstream criminology assumes a tech-
nocratic role in the repression of the working class simply is rejected by
mainstream criminologists, who argue that law is value-neutral. Con-
flict criminologists, on the other hand, would argue that in all societies,
"conventional" criminology (criminology which is approved by the es-
tablished power groups) will tend to function as a tool of those groups in
their attempt to control out-of-power groups. This will be true regard-
less of the composition of the groups, be they upstanding American citi-
zens and street criminals, Communist Party officials and Soviet
dissidents, or blacks and whites in South Africa. This is not a very re-
markable statement, as it would be quite surprising if any group ap-
proved and supported efforts that they thought would result in
substantial harm to their own values and interests.
5) The argument over the definition of crime has an extensive his-
tory in criminology. For example, Sutherland defined various white col-
lar activities as criminal, despite the fact that those activities violated
only civil law and in some cases violated no law at all.4 7 Sutherland was
responding to a genuine problem in criminology-that those activities
seemed clearly to be socially harmful, but they were not criminalized
because those who perpetrated them had substantial amounts of politi-
cal power. Radicals respond to the same phenomenon, and argue that
criminologists should study all "socially harmful behaviors that violate
basic human rights." In other words, what is defined as crime by the
criminologist will differ, to a greater or lesser degree, from what is de-
fined as crime by the legal mechanism. The problem is that "natural"
definitions of crime are imprecise and rely on the value-judgment of the
criminologist to distinguish between criminal and noncriminal behav-
ior.4
8
Conflict criminology avoids this problem by defining crime strictly
in terms of the official criminalizing functions of the law enforcement
agencies, so that it has no set relationship to the concept of social harm.
47 E. SUTHERLAND, supra note 27.
48 See, e.g., Tappan, Who ir the Crimzzal?, 12 AM. Soc. REv. 96, 97 (1947).
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Conflict criminology itself takes no position on whether any specific ac-
tion, whether officially criminalized or not, is socially harmful or is a
violation of basic human rights. It considers only whether the action is
criminalized by the official agencies of social control, and analyzes the
power relationships that underlie that criminalization. It neither asserts
nor denies that many criminalized actions are socially harmful, or that
many socially harmful actions are not criminalized. It argues only that
the distribution of criminalized actions is an inverse function of the dis-
tribution of political power.
Conflict criminology is sometimes found unpalatable because of
this position. Crime is often seen in a moral or value-laden context,
rather than merely as the output of a bureaucratic system. If one agrees
with the prevailing moral and political climate, conflict criminology
may be offensive because it argues that that climate is solely the result of
power distributions rather than a reflection of some intrinsically moral,
natural order of things.49 If one disagrees with the prevailing moral and
political climate, conflict criminology exposes the power distributions
underlying that climate, and one may tend to shift to the radical theo-
retical position as a method of seeking and justifying political change.
Conflict theory satisfies neither party because it is value-neutral. The
conflict theorist can still seek change through the political process, but in
so doing he would enter the conflict and compromise process in which
individuals and groups promote their own values and interests. The
conflict theorist would recognize that he was promoting his own values.
These values perhaps had been shaped by his study of the conflict proc-
ess, but they are his values nevertheless. He would also attempt to be
open about the relationship of his promotion of a particular set of values
to his own personal interests, even if those interests are subtle, such as
advancement of his academic career or desire for public recognition.
6) The notion that the overthrow of the capitalist economic sys-
tem would result in a solution to the crime problem has been criticized
as utopian, since in those societies where capitalism has been over-
thrown, crime has not been eliminated. In addition, any reduction of
crime in these societies appears to be more a function of severely repres-
sive enforcement practices than of the reduction of conflict. 50 Conflict
criminology, on the other hand, views conflict as a necessary adjunct to
all societies from which no society can be free. Crime appears with the
institution of law, and results from the conflict of values and interests
between different groups or segments of society that the law resolves in
favor of the group or segment better able to muster a preponderance of
49 Se S. SCHAFER, THE POLrrICAL CRIMINAL 36-37 (1974).
50 Klockars, supra note 42, at 499-500.
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political power. The groups or segments whose values or interests are
opposed by the law will have a tendency to break the law. High crime
groups are those whose values and interests are most often opposed by
the law, while low crime groups are those groups whose values and inter-
ests are most often favored by the law.
While radical criminology includes implications about the ideal,
utopian society, conflict criminology includes no such implications.
Rather, the nature of the best society would depend on how one views
the realtionship between values, interests, and the criminal law. To the
extent one believes that a particular set of values and interests should be
embodied in the criminal law, the best society would have as high-
crime-rate groups those whose behaviors challenge the values and inter-
ests. Conversely, low-crime-rate groups would be those whose behaviors
do not. Because many criminologists agree with the values and interests
embodied in the laws of their societies, they approve of those societies
and the distribution of their crime rates.
From a relativistic point of view, however, in the best society, power
would be distributed relatively evenly among all groups. In such a soci-
ety, crime would exist, but it would be relatively evenly distributed
among all the groups. That would follow from the legal resolution of
conflicts of values and interests, where each group would win some and
lose some, as contrasted to the present situation in which high power
groups win most, and low power groups lose most. Thus, the tendency
to break the law would be relatively evenly distributed throughout soci-
ety, and the distribution of crime rates would follow. Such a tendency is
already evidenced in our own society by the increasing rates of white
collar crime. These increases reflect the increased power of consumer
and "grass roots" groups, resulting in the enactment and enforcement of
stricter laws against behaviors characteristic of groups that traditionally
have had greater power. They do not reflect changes in the behavior of
white collar groups. If there were further redistribution of power, one
could also expect lower crime rates for traditionally high-crime groups
as they achieve the ability to pursue their values and interests through
legal rather than illegal means. The redistribution of crime rates, then,
would be both a function of increased crime rates for traditionally low-
crime-rate groups, and decreased crime rates for traditionally high-
crime-rate groups.
7) The danger of "cooptation" that radical criminologists fear
stems from the view that their primary purpose is political and action-
oriented, rather than empirical and scientific. If their primary purpose
were the search for empirically testable theories explaining social phe-
nomena, then they would not fear the assimilation of their findings into
other branches of the field. Mainstream criminologists, as well as con-
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flict theorists, see the fear of cooptation as antithetical to the concept of
science. They recognize the validity of some of the radicals' statements,
but argue that there is no necessary relationship between valid state-
ments and political actions.
The primary purpose of conflict criminology is objective, nonparti-
san analysis of the law enactment and enforcement process.5 ' Radical
criminology, however, maintains that no criminology, including conflict
theory, can be both objective and nonpartisan. All such criminology is
said to ultimately serve the interests of the ruling class. The only objec-
tive criminology is said to be radical criminology, which explicitly sides
with the working class against the interests of the ruling class. No mid-
dle ground exists between these two positions. As Quinney says: "To
think critically and radically today is to be revolutionary. To do other-
wise is to side with the oppression of the capitalist state."
52
Radical criminologists seem confused over whether all science is in-
herently value-laden, or whether conventional criminology has simply
been used by the establishment for political purposes. Some radicals
imply that all science is inherently value-laden, and then use this state-
ment to justify taking explicitly value-laden positions in their work.53 In
addition, some radicals deny that their work is positivistic.5 4 Marx,
however, regarded himself as a positivistic scientist who was describing
the objective processes of history, aside from any question of political
values. He also believed that man could promote those processes
through conscious action, but he generally separated his role as a "coffee
house conspirator" from his role as a social theorist.55 Certainly, Capital
is more than a polemical or value-laden tract-it is quite objective, re-
gardless of whether one considers it right or wrong. Radical criminolo-
gists carry over this idea of "objective" science in their focus on the
"objective" conditions of society and the "objective" interests of the var-
ious classes. But if they are doing "objective" social theorizing, then
there would seem to be no reason to fear that these ideas will be sub-
verted into a context that promotes the maintenance of capitalism.
56
The radicals' problem is that they do not maintain the separation be-
tween their roles as revolutionaries and their roles as social theorists.
The conflict theory position on this point is that all science can be
51 Turk, supra note 5, at 460-64.
52 R. QUINNEY (1974), supra note 1, at 16.
53 See, e.g., Editorial, supra note 4, at 3, which argues that the criticism that radical crimi-
nology is not value-free and nonpartisan "is hardly taken seriously today by sophisticated
philosophers of science."
54 See R. QUINNEY & J. WILDEMAN, su-a note 1, at 10.
55 Akers, Teog and Ideology in Marxist Cn'mino/1qg, 16 CRIMINOLOGy 527, 540 (1979).




used by power groups to promote their own values and interests, and
that, by and large, mainstream criminology has been so used by the
establishment in America. This can be done by determining the choice
of research problems that will be addressed (through control of funds
earmarked for research in criminology) and by controlling the interpre-
tation of the results through information dispersal. 5 7 However, this is
true in all societies, including communist and socialist ones. Conflict
theory also holds that empirically established patterns or relationships
that emerge as a result of scientific investigation are not in themselves
"value-laden." These are "objective" or "true" within the meaning of
these terms in contemporary philosophy of science. 58 Conflict theory,
like mainstream criminology, holds that the purpose of science is the
establishment of empirically verifiable or falsifiable facts and the expla-
nation of those facts through theory. But like radical criminology, it is
aware that such facts and theory are often used by power groups in the
struggle for the control of the law enactment and enforcement processes.
The distinction between conflict and radical criminology as de-
scribed in the present paper parallels a distinction long recognized in
sociology between two branches of the conflict tradition. In 1960, Mar-
tindale described that as the distinction between "conflict ideologies,"
which included Marxian socialism, and "sociological conflict theories,"
which included the works of Bagehot, Glumplowicz, Ratzenhofer, Sum-
ner, Small, Oppenheimer, and George Vold, whom Martindale called
"perhaps the foremost conflict theorist in present-day North
America. '59 Martindale argued that conflict ideologies were "sets of
ideas vindicating particular social positions and spurring particular ac-
tion programs" while sociological conflict theory, "though some of its
propositions coincide with those appearing in the ideologies, is scientific,
resting its hypotheses on the scientific standards of the discipline."6
More recently, Wallace and Wolf have described a similar distinction in
the sociological conflict tradition:
The first group of theorists believes the social scientist to have a moral
obligation to engage in a critique of society. It refuses to separate fact from
value. Theorists in this group also generally believe that in principle a
society could exist in which there were no longer grounds for social con-
flict. Therefore these theorists are frequently considered Utopian writers.
The second group, by contrast, considers conflict to be an inevitable and
permanent aspect of social life; and it also rejects the idea that social sci-
57 R. QUINNEY (1974), supra note 1, at 17-50 documents this point.
58 p. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY (1966); T.
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970); K. POPPER, THE
LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (1959).
59 D. MARTINDALE, THE NATURE AND TYPES OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 200 (1960).
60 Id. at 176.
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ence's conclusions are necessarily value-laden. Instead, its proponents are
interested in establishing a social science with the same canon of objectiv-
ity as informs the natural sciences.
6 1
Modern Marxists, the Frankfort School theorists, and C. Wright Mills
are said to be in the first group of theorists, while Ralf Dahrendorf,
Lewis Coser, and Randall Collins are said to be in the second group.
These two branches of the sociological conflict tradition form the bases
of conflict and radical theorizing in criminology. The failure to ade-
quately distinguish between these two types of criminological theory has
meant that a significant area of scientific sociological theorizing has
been largely ignored when it might be fruitfully applied to the problem
of crime.
61 R. WALLACE & A. WOLF, CoNTEMPoRARY SocIoLoGI cAL THEORY 77 (1980).
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